On August 13, 2026, Argentina's Economy Minister Luis Caputo announced a relaxation of strict regulations that had limited dollar-denominated loans since the 2001 crisis. Banks can now lend up to 15% of their dollar deposits to companies that don't generate foreign currency. While the government sees this as a way to reactivate the economy, former central bank officials and economists warn it could create systemic risks and repeat past mistakes.

What Changed with the New Regulation

In a press conference on August 13, 2026, Argentina's Minister of Economy, Luis Caputo, announced a modification to Article 23 of Decree 905/02, a rule that has governed dollar lending since the aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis. The new measure allows banks to allocate up to 15% of their foreign currency deposits to finance companies that do not generate dollars, provided those loans are settled in the official exchange market (known as MULC) and converted into pesos.

According to the government, the financial system currently has nearly USD 6 billion in idle lending capacity in foreign currency. Caputo explained that the goal is to 'generate more credit, lower interest rates, create jobs, and reactivate the economy.' He specifically mentioned the construction and automotive industries as potential beneficiaries.

The Central Bank of Argentina (BCRA), led by Santiago Bausili, accompanied the measure with prudential safeguards: the minimum capital required for these loans will be 25% higher than for other types of financing, and they will count as 1.25 times the usual amount for credit exposure limits. Additionally, banks must assess repayment capacity under various exchange rate scenarios.

Economists and Former Officials Push Back

The decision has drawn sharp criticism from economists and former central bank leaders. Guido Sandleris, who headed the BCRA during the Macri administration and has generally supported Milei's economic policies, was blunt: 'I have supported many of the economic team's measures, but I believe that relaxing the rules for granting dollar loans is a bad idea.' Sandleris warned that it 'erodes one of the few relevant consensuses that Argentina had managed to build: a very strict prudential regulation of the banking system in dollars.'

He recalled that this regulation was born after the 2001 crisis to prevent a devaluation from making dollar loans unpayable and endangering deposits. 'The authorized amount is limited; the precedent it sets is not,' he stressed.

Andrés Neumeyer, former chief economist at the BCRA and professor at UTDT, echoed those concerns: 'We are sliding down the slippery slope of macroprudential relaxation. Relaxing restrictions on currency mismatches creates systemic risk. When there is a significant real depreciation, dollar depositors are either bailed out by taxpayers or converted to pesos.' He added: 'Credit populism is one of the reasons why an independent central bank is healthy.'

Another former official, who requested anonymity, compared the measure to the shortcuts of the 1990s: 'We already took those shortcuts and they ended with the asymmetric pesification in 2001. At first it's all celebration; then comes the hangover.'

Will It Actually Boost the Economy?

While the government defends the measure as a stimulus, many analysts doubt its effectiveness. Diego Coatz, an economist specializing in SMEs, said: 'The biggest problem for SMEs today is activity and consumption. I don't think this will have an impact.' Fernando Marull, director of FMyA, agreed: 'The creditworthy borrower who was already creditworthy will continue to be. The one who wasn't won't change.'

Carlos Pérez, chief economist at Fundación Capital and a former BCRA manager, considered the measure 'goes in the right direction, but helps reactivation in a limited way.' He questioned the timing: 'This measure would have been better when the country risk was falling and the BCRA was buying more than USD 100 million per day.' He also noted it is the third relaxation of this kind, and 'if this is part of a sequence that continues to loosen, we need to be careful.'

Context: Dollars Under the Mattress and the FGS

Caputo also confirmed plans to use part of the FGS (Sustainability Guarantee Fund) of Anses (the national social security administration) to offer long-term deposits to banks, with rates tied to the UVA inflation index. Minister of Human Capital Sandra Pettovello had been resisting that move. Deputy Minister José Luis Daza assured that the IMF is 'aware and in agreement' with the relaxation.

The measure aims to encourage savers to take their dollars out from under the mattress. Caputo gave an example: 'If someone had USD 10,000 for 20 years under the mattress, at 6% they could now have USD 32,000.' However, critics pointed out that Caputo himself keeps a large portion of his assets abroad, according to his 2024 sworn declaration.

The ghost of currency mismatch risk haunts the debate. The regulation now being relaxed survived nearly 24 years across governments of different stripes, and dismantling it at a time when the real exchange rate is appreciated raises concerns. As Sandleris summarized: 'Prudential financial regulations usually involve short-term costs, but they exist to protect a much more valuable asset: financial stability.'